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From: From a retired Army Colonel (forwarded by Captain XXX, a former company commander)
Date: 13 Nov 2000
Time: 13:03:23
The following Army memo from GEN Coburn, Commanding General of the Army Materiel Command (AMC) to GEN Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, paints a dim picture of Army readiness, particularly as it pertains to the FY01 budget. All Army programs are either RED or AMBER. Nothing is GREEN. Program after program after program with insufficient funding. Bottom line: I do not think the Army is capable today of fullfilling its required war fighting mission...and this memo suggests it's only gettinig worse. It is typical of what I see and what my colleagues at the pointy end of the spear see. And it's a slap in the face.
Captain XXX
----------[Gen Coburn's Memo to the Chief of Staff]----------
AMCRM-B
7 November 2000
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ERIC K. SHINSEKI, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY, 200 ARMY PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0200
SUBJECT: Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Execution
1. As the Army launches into FY01, I want to ensure you are aware of the impact to Army-wide readiness as AMC executes reduced OMA funding levels. I have assessed all AMC key programs as either Red or Amber. On 14 August I discussed these concerns with your staff.
2. To begin, my FY01 OMA funding levels are significantly less than FY00. I understand the severity of funding constraints Army-wide and recognize some risk is necessary; however, AMC has very limited flexibility with which to fix ourselves without adversely degrading readiness. AMC funding directly affects the Army's current and future readiness. These are my most pressing concerns:
a. Sustainment Systems Technical Support (SSTS): Contract support is funded at 24% of total requirement. Army critical weapon systems, such as the AH-64, CH-47, KIOWA WARRIOR, M1A1 and BFVS have inadequate funding for vital contract functions. This includes logistics and engineering support from the APACHE system integrator/prime contractor for field problems or safety issues. In addition, Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) operational problems will not be resolved, affecting near-term readiness, and predictive failure analysis cannot be provided for the KIOWA WARRIOR. Potentially, the CHINOOK fleet could be partially or fully grounded due to inability to determine cause, effect and solutions to safety related fleet problems. In addition, Lead-the-Fleet requirements are unfunded, causing the inability to investigate problems experienced by fielded aircraft.
Also within SSTS, my Stockpile Reliability Program (SRP) is affected. Bottom line for SRP is that missile suspensions in STINGER, TOW, DRAGON, and HELLFIRE stockpiles will occur. These suspended assets cannot be shipped or issued, creating the logistic burden of transporting unrestricted assets for replacement. Also, as our missile systems continue to go unmonitored, the reliability and safety of the remaining unrestricted assets become questionable.
b. Base Operations (BASOPS)/Real Property Maintenance (RPM): Despite all cost cutting and streamlining efforts taken to date, we are struggling to maintain minimum levels of support for our tenants and ourselves. To execute the FY01 program, service levels are being further reduced. In fact, preventative maintenance of facilities, heating, cooling, and ventilation systems is being done almost exclusively on an emergency basis. This translates to increased risk and increased future costs. I expect to experience a loss of productivity this year due to system failures. These failures directly impact the well-being and readiness of Army soldiers, civilians and their families.
c. Contract Logistics Support (CLS): CLS for Army's Fixed Wing program is underfunded--contract requirements currently funded at 81%. This will require the Army to place 57 aircraft in storage and close approximately 19 Beddown Base Sites. Loss of these aircraft will severely impact the operational support airlift mission worldwide to include USEUCOM, USSOUTHCOM and USCENTCOM.
d. Soldier Modernization: Congressional language directs the Army to spend $14M to procure Modular General Purpose Tents, however funding was not provided. To comply, I must take funds from Soldier Modernization, i.e., the Body Armor Sets Individual Countermine (BASIC) procurement will be reduced to zero. This decreases our soldier's efficiency and safety in an operational environment.
e. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS): The Army War Reserve Program is funded at less than 65% of requirements. This degrades fightability in terms of serviceablity, completeness, and speed of issue. For the Army Strategic Mobility Program, maintenance cycles for five ships cannot occur. This will critically degrade the Army's ability to provide a fightable combat ready brigade set of equipment and reliable ammunition to deploying forces. Army equipment modernization plans for the 8th Brigade and LCDXXI may not be executed in the required timeframes due to the domino effect on outyear maintenance cycles. For land-based programs it seriously degrades fightability standards, specifically equipment serviceability and the ability to hand off combat ready equipment. Land-based programs will be unable to meet equipment redistribution timelines to higher DAMPL APS priorities.
f. Depot Maintenance: Maintenance efforts Army-wide are severely underfunded. My most pressing concerns are:
(1) Communications-Electronics (C-E). Our shelter-based maintenance capability will further decline impacting Military Intelligence, Aviation and Special Operations Forces Units supporting force projection and contingency operations. Also, readiness for Tactical Multi-Band Satellite Terminals and Satellite Antennas will be degraded, reducing or limiting operational capabilties while being deployed to sensitive mission areas.
(2) C-E Post Production Software Support (PPSS). We will be unable to implement field software corrections for tactical circuit and message switches and their network management systems, resulting in a loss/degradation of vital communications/ intelligence circuits used worldwide by the warfighters and the National Command Authority. Software maintenance for Army-specific Global Positioning System (GPS) Receivers will be eliminated, risking loss of navigation information for the warfighter and increased possibility of fratricide.
(3) Aviation and Missile Area. Repairs cannot be accomplished to crash-damaged rotary wing aircraft (AH-64A/D, UH-60A/L, CH-47D or OH-58D). Fixes to correct critical defects to the UH-60, PATRIOT and MLRS Systems cannot be completed, degrading readiness and exposing Army users to higher maintenance costs and potential safety issues. Also, the CH-47D Refurbish-ment Program may be halted which will delay fieldings to the Aviation Center, Army Reserves and National Guard.
(4) Combat Area. PPSS on ABRAMS and PALADIN for mission critical computer resources, battlefield automated systems, trainers and simulators cannot be provided. Performance of 3-year cyclic water-craft on-condition maintenance may not be accomplished.
g. Supply Depot Operations (SDO)/Second Destination Transportation (SDT): SDO/SDT receipts and issues are funded at approximately 35% of requirements--about four months worth. This is an untenable situation and I have taken action to ensure that the most critical requirements will be funded. I have instructed my staff to limit materiel issues to only those required to maintain near term readiness while instituting an almost complete embargo on excess returns. This course of action will support funded depot maintenance programs and maintain at least a minimal materiel release level of effort to field units.
h. Defense Standardization Program: Supports SECDEF's responsibility to maintain a unified defense standardization program. At current funding levels, acquisition gains will be lost; industry/association partnerships cannot continue, interoperability and commonality between systems will suffer; legacy system support will be threatened as resupply, inventory and cost of ownership increases and affects readiness.
i. Ammunition Stockpile Management: Our deteriorated CONUS stockpile will not allow us to outload ammunition within timeframes required to support MTW OPLANs-10% of contingency stockpile is unserviceable. Lack of surveillance/inventories will result in a 5-day outloading delay for contingencies. We are increasing the risk to the warfighter because we are unable to provide the best available war reserve ammunition for MTWs and training.
3. Finally, I must mention two other OMA funding issues for which I have concern.
a. First is the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). I understand the importance of this effort and have, therefore, instructed my staff to internally fund this requirement, but again this is at the cost of my other OMA programs.
b. The second issue is the separation costs (VERA/VSIP) related to QDR reductions. I received much less funding than I had anticipated for separation costs. Although I do not yet have a detailed analysis on the residual impacts, I know that it will exacerbate my OMA funding situation in FY01.
4. Overall, I am concerned that my Commanders cannot provide the timely, quality support that our soldiers deserve, i.e., safe, ready, reliable weapons and support systems in peace and war.
5. AMC -- Your Readiness Command ... Serving Soldiers Proudly!
//S//
JOHN G. COBURN
General, USA Commanding