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From: CPT Bob Krumm
Date: 19 Apr 2001
Time: 12:48:09
I just completed reading MAJ Vandergriff's presentation on RHA and find myself about ninety percent in agreement on the specifics of his personnel plan, and 100% in agreement on the overall concept. Where I hope to learn more is in the implementation of this plan. MAJ Vandergriff outlines very well the fundamental mismatch between our doctrine and our current Army culture, and the resultant inability of that doctrine to evolve. I have served in four cavalry squadrons and can confirm that while our doctrine encourages initiative, risk-taking, and out-of-the-box thinking, our culture punishes such thought.
The good news is that the youngest batch of new officers is not wedded to the concept of paralysis in the face of bureaucratic inertia. During my command of a cavalry troop nine of my eleven lieutenants challenged, probed, and tested the system to see how they could improve themselves and the system. They were the kind of young future leaders who in MAJ Vandergriff’s Army would keep their soldiers and their leaders on their toes. The bad news is that seven of those nine lieutenants have left the Army. They grew tired of questioning (as they were told lieutenants should do), but not receiving answers (or even worse, being told to shut up).
As an Army we recently lost from a generation of lieutenants and captains, those who possess the ability to acquire a classical education--that is, an education where the free exchange of ideas and questions is essential to learning. What is left of this generation becomes a new layer of middle management unempowered to say “yes”, and too distant from the front in both time and space to lend support to the question, “why?”
What bothers me most is that our current repressive Army culture fits within the context of our larger society. We, as a nation, look for centralized solutions rather than attempt to fix problems locally. Historically we turned to our immediate circle to address problems--ie, charities, town hall, local school boards, state legislatures. However, today we see a homogenization of thought and a centralization of action as directed by our nation's capitol. Consequently, we collectively turn to Washington to address such local needs as a flood, a new highway exit, and to educate our children. Analogously, within the Army, NCOs and young officers must seek approval through layers of bureaucracy in order to resolve relatively simple problems with simple solutions. The tragedy is that we tell young leaders this is not how it is supposed to be, but our reality speaks otherwise.
MAJ Vandergriff's focus upon the symbiotic relationship between strong small units and a professional officer corps illuminates the path the Army must take to continue to evolve in a changing world. However, that path is mined by the national zeitgeist of centralization. I look forward to reading his new book to see what insights he might share to bypass this “friendly” minefield.