"Genghis John"

by Lee Gaillard
AIR&SPACE Magazine
Dec/Jan 2003

Book Review of
Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War
by Robert Coram. Little, Brown, 2002. 496 pp., $27.95

Questioning General Norman Schwarzkopf's initial Desert Storm battle plan, a "head-to-head assault against the main strength of the Iraqi forces," then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney summoned John R. Boyd, a retired Air Force colonel, for extended consultation.

The subsequent Marine Corps amphibious feint toward Kuwait, followed by a successful Army left-hook attack through the desert, was, writes Robert Coram, a direct reflection of Boyd's theories. Indeed, Marine Corps Commandant Charles Krulak's 1997 tribute hailed Boyd as an "architect of America's victory in the Gulf War."

In this fascinating biography, Robert Coram captures the dazzling diversity of John Boyd-fighter pilot, aerial tactician, engineer, and scholar. Author of ten books and a reporter at the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Coram limns the life of "the most famous fighter pilot in the world," a man who "rarely met a general he couldn't offend" and who unabashedly told a military contractor that his proposed aircraft had to be "made out of balonium."

From Boyd's Depression-era childhood in Erie, Pennsylvania, Coram takes us to MiG Alley in Korea and back to the furball world of the U.S. Air Force Fighter Weapons School, where "Forty-Second Boyd" (the time it took him to best an aerial opponent) enjoyed rat-racing, skunk fights, and hosing fighter pilots in the skies over Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. The book moves on to the halls of the Pentagon, where Boyd's theories energized the "Fighter Mafia," who redesigned the F-15 and conceived today's ubiquitous F-16 lightweight fighter. Back then, generals and admirals resisted Boyd-think, but lower-echelon officers, especially in the Marine Corps, espoused his principles. Now they've caught on with some of the leadership as well.

Precursors of Boyd's ideas appeared in 1942, when U.S. Admiral Raymond Spruance got inside the decision cycle of Japan's Admiral Chuichi Nagumo and launched his planes early in the Battle of Midway. Another precursor came in 1943, when Soviet ace Aleksandr Pokryshkin introduced "bookshelf" formations enabling his P-39 squadrons to control the vertical plane, providing speed, altitude, and maneuverability options as the squadrons bounced approaching German ground-support aircraft.

Later, during the cold war, Boyd explored, expanded, and codified such intuitive concepts. He taught himself calculus and, after experiencing an epiphany while studying for a thermodynamics exam, worked out the mathematics for his Energy-Maneuverability Theory. Coram tells how Boyd subsequently proved that most Soviet fighters possessed dogfighting capabilities superior to those of their U.S. counterparts-that the Soviet aircraft could outmaneuver the F-111, for example, throughout its entire flight envelope.

Today, reverberations from Boyd's landmark study "time-based theory of conflict" continue to be felt. Management guru Tom Peters, author of Thriving on Chaos, acknowledges Boyd's influence on his writing and his impact on corporate strategies. And in the recently published book Tank, author Patrick Wright, discussing agility of the Future Main Battle Tank, writes that "the point of these 'quick high-tempo operations' is to do everything so speedily that you're 'inside the enemy's decision cycle.'" Straight from Boyd, but not credited in text, index, or acknowledgments. That his revolutionary thinking has become generic is the highest compliment it could receive.

Despite Boyd's numerous awards and a combination of acumen and unwavering honesty that inspired others to shake up Pentagon weapons testing programs and procurement procedures, his lack of people skills would impede his promotions. Similarly, his obsessive work ethic devastated family relations. In that grim context, Coram's description of daughter Mary Ellen's final moments with her dying father is incredibly moving.

A few minor glitches: "the World War II B-50" first flew in 1947-and did not participate in Korean War B-29 bombing missions. Nor was the 1960s Marine Corps still teaching recruits "the concept of advancing on line," an outmoded practice replaced by squad-based fire-and-maneuver derived from German army tactics at the close of World War I. McDonnell's F-101 served as a long-range interceptor, not "an escort for [Strategic Air Command] bombers."

Nonetheless, the book captures the essence of John Boyd, who got internal cannon put back into fighters, whose Aerial Attack Study became the official Air Force fighter tactics teaching manual, and who also generated an innovative paradigm for structuring military operations in our post-cold war world.

-Lee Gaillard writes about military issues and technology for Defense News, The San Francisco Chronicle, and U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.

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