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Beyond Insurgency: An End to Our War in Iraq Part IV of a series about America’s new Long War September 27, 2007
We’re lost in the details about Iraq, even experts like Lynch. The statistics, the differing narratives, the personal attacks. Forecasts for next month, next week, the next news cycle. Here we will instead look for the big picture. What are the major trends in Iraq? The following are guesses amidst the fog of war. The first two expand upon observations in my article of March 2007. These were controversial then, but almost consensus wisdom today.
The last two sections of this paper discuss what this means for America.
Let’s examine each in of these in turn. 1. Iraq is fragmenting into three parts.
Throughout Iraq local elites are creating regimes. Supported by militias which run the gamut from criminal gangs to formal armies, they fill the vacuum left by the collapse of Iraq’s central state. This fragmentation can be seen as a descent into civil war, or as the preliminary to formation of a new Iraq state. These proto-states can be building blocks for something larger. Many of these powerful local elites have the power to negotiate and strike deals. This offers a path to peace for us and the Iraq people, perhaps the only such. In this sense the details matter little: soft partition, hard partition, a federation, or individual sovereign entities. The “Anbar model” shows the future of Iraq: local elites defeat “foreign” forces, consolidate power, then “ally” with the Coalition. That is, we provide arms and training; in exchange they give us little or nothing. No wonder the Shiite Arabs wish to join the Kurds and Sunni Arabs at this free lunch. In this context “foreign” includes not only Coalition forces, but those of ethnic or religious groups either foreign to that region of Iraq or a minority within it. The first zone, Kurdistan is a fact. As usual, diplomatic recognition lags the fact. After fifty years of fighting, the Kurdish insurgency has won. They control an army (the Peshmerga), levy taxes, enact laws, and have the loyalty of a majority of the region’s people. Taking the next step to their future, they’ve signed their first oil contract. Significantly, they’ve signed with the Hunt Oil Company. The bio of their CEO, Ray L. Hunt, tells us much. Son of Texas oilman H. L. Hunt, Bush appointed him to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in October 2005. There is no insurgency in the second zone, southern Iraq, where authority has devolved to local communities run by a mixture of tribal, ethnic, and religious leaders. There is no longer an insurgency in the third zone, the Sunni Arab regions. There, as in Kurdistan, the locals have defeated both internal and external opposition – including the foreign fighters brought in as shock troops against Coalition and Iraq (i.e., Kurdish, and Shiite) forces. We have sounded the death knell of the “National” Iraq government by financing and arming the Sunni Arab police/militia. Doing so without their consent blatantly signals to everyone that it’s finished. (Imagine if Iran armed the Bloods and Crips to “bring peace to Los Angeles”.) Elites in all three regions have come to terms with the foreign occupiers (i.e., us). To varying extents we arm and finance them in exchange for real or imagined concessions and/or support. Our government’s actions, if not yet its words, acknowledge defeat in Iraq. Our “national strategy for victory in Iraq” is titled “Helping the Iraqi People Defeat the Terrorists and Build an Inclusive Democratic State.” The terrorists are what pass for governments in Iraq, except for the tiny fraction of foreign terrorists now being expelled. These new governments are not inclusive. Some of them might become democratic. Our long-term goal: “Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism {GWOT}.” At best we might get some of these things. Which of these is most important? Which are worth paying this war’s high cost in blood and money?
2. Development of local, armed “governments” drives this process. Ethnic cleansing is their major tool. This is a road to peace for Iraq, perhaps the only path still open. Nationalism is the dominate form of social organization today because it allows mobilization of greater energies than other forms. A common step in its implementation is elimination of “alien” peoples in the new body politic through
This process horrifies even the winners – but only afterwards – and so goes into the memory hole. Children’s history texts usually tell only the story of heroic nation-building, not the unfortunate side-effects.
This is how nationalists build nations. This is the path to peace for Iraq, or perhaps the nation formerly known as Iraq. 3. The Coalition has been and probably will be irrelevant to nation-building in Iraq.
It is not about us. It should not be about us. This is a major tenet of fourth generation war (4GW). Western analysts distort history when they overemphasize our impact on the post-WWII, post-colonial world. The American west was shaped by cheap, available firearms. As the saying goes, “The good Lord made all men, but Colonel Colt made them equal.” Today 4GW shapes the world by allowing even small proto-states to defeat foreign occupiers – even superpowers like the USA and Russia. Waging 4GW, the Iraq people will determine the outcome in Iraq. It makes little difference what we do. Stay or go. Retreat to our forts in the desert or patrol the cities. Bombing or subtle COIN tactics. Events in Iraq evolve according to its internal dynamics, which we do not understand and have proved beyond our power to substantially influence. Our pride, even arrogance, makes this difficult to see and almost impossible to accept.
This moment of honesty and clarity was too hot for Senator Schumer. His website shows this speech with the offending words “inability of American soldiers to protect these tribes” changed to “The lack of protection for these tribes”. Comforting vagueness, shielding Americans from the awareness that our power has limits. The tribes used al-Qaeda as shock troops, and turned on them when their usefulness was over. Coalition leaders predicted neither the start nor the end of this process. Local wars, determined by local factors. Also, we see here the same lack of intelligence that hobbled our COIN programs in Vietnam forty years ago – just as it does in Iraq today – and is a key element of the home court advantage in 4GWs. To successfully wage 4GW requires confronting harsh realities. We have borrowed and spent a vast fortune in Iraq since the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s government. Far more important than the money is the cost in blood: the injuries and deaths of our troops. All this was probably spent in vain. No matter how fine our intentions, Iraq has and will go its own way. Twenty years from now we might look at the Middle East as today we see Southeast Asia – and wonder how it differs from what would have been if we had not spent so many long, bloody years there. Iraq is their land, which means that the locals have the “moral high ground.” It matters not who has the finer ideals, which only God can judge. Our inability to accept this might prevent us from ever adapting to 4GW, and doom us to an age of defeat in our foreign wars. 4. More fighting lies in Iraq’s future: struggles for control and border wars. How much fighting remains until the Iraq region regains peace? Warnings of massive bloodshed are often made by pundits with a near-100% record of error in this war. This is just one possible scenario, which does not make it worth our spending unlimited funds and blood attempting (perhaps in vain) to prevent it. There are other scenarios. Each proto-state might achieve internal order. They might even come to terms with each other. At this point almost anything seems possible. We can expect continued conflicts of two kinds in Iraq. The number, duration, scope, and intensity of these conflicts are unknowable. First, fighting within the three zones, as local elites fight for control. It need not be large scale killing, nor even violent. Will the PUK and PDK continue to peacefully share power in Kurdistan? How much influence do the Turkmen have? How is the northern oil shared? Who rules the Shia-dominated areas? To mention just one fault line in detail, will fighting continue or even intensify between Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), nominal followers of Muqtada al-Sadr, and those aligned with the other major Shi’ite group, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC, formerly SCIRI). In one of Iraq’s many ironies, both the US and Iran support SIIC against JAM. For more on this conflict see the Department of Defense’s September “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” report, especially page 24. Second, fighting to establish the borders between zones. For example, the next flashpoint might be over control of Kirkuk. Whatever the nature and scope of the fighting, as the national government fades to oblivion our role as the arms provider for all sides will become increasingly problematic – both morally and diplomatically. 5. Recommendations for our Expedition to Iraq Even for those who believe we are in a Long War, not every battleground need be the decisive one. Let’s conserve our strength for better opportunities, knowing when to hold and when to fold.
There are dozens of proposals for withdrawal from Iraq. See the Commonwealth Institute’s website for links to most of these. 6. What does this tell us about our new Long War? In Iraq we have made many mistakes, but that is neither unusual in history, nor even inconsistent with winning.
Our conduct of the Iraq War is probably no worse than par. While not encouraging for our prospects in our new Long War, neither does it warrant despair. However, some mistakes are often terminal in warfare. First, lack of clarity about goals. One cause of the runaway escalation of WWI was changing goals, as both sides adopted new goals – since the current ones did not justify the slaughter taking place. So it has gone in this war.
The first was accomplished. The second was and is probably unrealistic. The third was always beyond our power. The last (hopefully the last) is almost delusional. Not a good progression. Second, perhaps worse, is our distorted vision: seeing events in Iraq as progress – not a series of defeats incurred at great cost. This suggests our senior political and executive remain trapped in their own spin. Perhaps they believe that al Qaeda is our primary opposition in Iraq, and that taking our arms, training, and money makes one an ally of America. If so we are in serious trouble. This is part four in a series analyzing our new Long War, one of the great challenges for 21st century America – our confrontation with a world in which fourth generation warfare has become the dominant form of global violence. Afterward Are the things reported here good or bad? Please consult a priest or philosopher for answers to such questions. This author only discusses what was, what is, and what might be. Please send your comments and corrections on this article to Fabius Maximus was the Roman leader who saved Rome from Hannibal by recognizing its weakness and therefore the need to conserve its strength. He turned from the easy path of macho “boldness” to the long, difficult task of rebuilding Rome’s power and greatness. His life holds profound lessons for 21st Century America. Qualifications of the Author? Read the past articles by Fabius Maximus. A work of intellectual analysis stands on its own logic, supported by the author’s track record. Contact him at . |