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Forces Are Too Small to Execute 2-MTW Strategy
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Had Much Larger Force During War with Iraq, but Still Required 75% of Active Tacair, 42% of MBTs, 46% of Carriers, 37% of Army Personnel, and 46% of Marines |
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Took 5 Months to Get Ready and Required Extensive Cannibalization |
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Burden of Forward-Deployed Units in SSCs Is Now Higher than in Cold War |
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Emerging Readiness Problems (Acknowledged in 29 Sept SASC Hearing)
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Personnel: Declining Retention - Growing Skill Deficiencies (e.g., Pilots, 2nd Term Enlisted) |
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Units: Understrength Combat Units & Undermanned Ships |
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Material Condition: Spares Shortfalls, Rising Cannibalization Rates, Growing Depot & RPM Backlogs, Increased Workloads |
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Combat Training: Cutbacks, Reduced Realism, Declining Ammo Allowances |
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Declining Morale: Frequent Deployments, Increasing Workloads, Quality of Life Leadership Problems (Not Mentioned at Hearing) and The Wedge of Mistrust |
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