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Weapon Systems Effectiveness

By examining how well our forces perform in the field against today's threats, we can gain some insight into what sorts of forces and weapons we will need in the future. Are our Cold War era weapons, perhaps employed with new doctrines and tactics, suitable for this new world?  Or do we need to develop new (and not necessarily just cheaper) weapons?

"Comanche Program Objectives Need to be Revised to More Achievable Levels," latest GAO report (June 2001, 336 KB .pdf) The title pretty much says it all for this program, which began in 1983 and has been restructured five times.  In the last 18 months alone, projected costs have increased over 10%.

The latest F-22 Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E) report.  Overview of F-22 testing during FY 2000.  As major procurement decisions loom on the program, this report observes that "The F-22 flight test program has fallen considerably behind schedule during the last year ... As of January 3, 2001, flight test aircraft have only accumulated 324 hours of the 590 hours planned just one year ago.The full report on all DOT&E activity for the year is available from their web site at http://www.dote.osd.mil/reports/FY00/index.html

"The F-22 Program: Fact Vs. Fiction."  Retired USAF fighter pilot, designer, and tactician, E. E. Riccioni, takes on the F-22 as the wrong airplane at the wrong price for the 21st Century.  Offering only a marginal increase in capability over the F-15C, it will absorb money badly needed to solve our real problems, which include fire support for land forces and the emerging threat of 4th generation warfare.  In MS Word format, 196.5 KB.  Also available in HTML from the POGO site.

"Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded Congressional Limitations," GAO Report NSIAD-00-178, 8/15/00. The GAO concluded that F-22 production costs, as estimated by both USAF and OSD, are at risk of breaking Congressional caps.  If the OSD estimate is correct, the overrun could amount to 22%. The primary reason, according to GAO is that contractors have been unable to achieve promised cost reductions.  Also in .pdf format.

Military Analysis Network.  Probably the best single source for information on any weapon system worldwide.  Published by the Federation of American Scientists.

About the Comments (Full text of the references are available on Infowar)

 

Comments:

417
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"Buy Before You Fly" & the Asymmetric Politics of Risk Reduction, January 5, 2001
347
Hill Staffer Changes Decisions in Washington—Degraded Pilot Skills, February 28, 2000
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Was Task Force Hawk a Blessing in Disguise? January 27, 2000
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Why Did Slobo Cave? (II) ... or ... Why America Needs an Independent Bomb Survey, June 28, 1999
293
Why did Slobo Cave? -- The Case for a G-8 Trojan Horse … and … Why America Needs an Unbiased Strategic Bomb Survey, June 26, 1999
250
INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO: Can Airpower Pull America's Fat out of the Fire, April 1, 1999
228
TOYS vs BOYS -- F/A-18E/F Freaks Out the Pentagon, January 27, 1999
225
F/A18E/F Reveals 2 Rules for Real Decision Making Reform, January 14, 1999
223
F-22, F-18E/F, JSF, and V-22: A Trip Report to Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, and Bell-Textron by a Member of Congressional Staff, January 13, 1999
164
How Effective Are Air Power & Precision Weapons in Urban Combat? (III)  August 5, 1998
163
How Effective Are Air Power & Precision Weapons in Urban Combat?  August 4, 1998
162
How Effective is Air Power in Urban Combat?  August 4, 1998