Comment #: 223
Reference:
[1] Member of the Congressional Staff, "Report on Travel to U.S. Aircraft Manufacturers (Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, Bell-Textron)," November 1998. Attached.
The attached report describes the F-22, F/A-18E/F, Joint Strike Fighter, and V-22 from the perspective of a member of the Congressional Staff. It now circulating widely on the back channel comm circuits of Capital Hill. It contains lots of useful information.
I was astounded, for example, to learn that the mid-fuselage of the F-22 takes 60,000 manhours of labor to assemble at the Lockheed factory in Ft Worth. It took only 29,000 manhours to assemble an entire F-16 in the same factory in 1984. Part of the growth in touch labor is a consequence of the greater difficulty of assembling the complex composite structures of the F-22. But declining productivity could also be an issue. This is suggested by the fact that the assembly time for the F-16 in the Ft. Worth factory had risen from 29,000 to 45,000 man hours per plane by 1989.
The author also makes an interesting comparison of the F-18E/F to the F-15E. I have checked this comparison with some experts, and the author is indeed correct. My sources told me the F-15E powered by the Pratt &Whitney F100PW-229 can out-turn the E/F, out-climb it, out-accelerate it, fly further, carry a far larger payload, and compared to the E/F, has a more capable radar and infrared targeting system, as well as a much more sophisticated electronic integration of the displays in the front and rear cockpits than the two-seat F/A-18F model. The only thing the E/F can do that the 15E can not do is land on a carrier. Despite these differences, not to mention the fact that the F-15E began production 10 years before the E/F, the F/A-E/F costs one-third MORE than the F-15E. Surely the addition of a carrier capability did not require this kind of performance reduction at a higher cost after ten years of advancing technology. The cost-capability-time asymmetries suggest fascinating questions about productivity and technology, because both airplanes were designed and are produced by the same corporate culture in the SAME factory.
The author's purpose was not to address such productivity questions but to do general fact finding. I urge readers to study this report and its end notes. No doubt, you will have many other questions about the efficacy of the aircraft modernization program, not to mention the state of affairs in an aircraft industry plagued by over capacity as well as the "buy-before-you-fly" petrologies of front loading and political engineering.
Chuck Spinney
November 1998
Report on Travel to U.S. Aircraft Manufacturers (Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, Bell-Textron)
This report is organized by aircraft type.
F-22
F/A-18E/F
JSF
V-22
Overall Impressions and Conclusions
Aircraft Production Table
Endnotes
Summary: The Air Force currently plans to buy 341 F-22s to replace existing F-15 fighters. Three characteristics predominate F-22 justifications: 1) "stealth," or low radar cross section to reduce radar detection range, 2) supercruise, the ability to fly at supersonic speeds without using the fuel-guzzling afterburner, and 3) advanced "avionics" (electronics to control the aircraft and operate offensive and defensive systems). "Initial Operational Capability" is scheduled for 2005.
Cost: The current plan is to buy the 341 aircraft for $63.8 billion (December, 1997 DoD cost estimate). Total program unit cost is currently at $187 million per aircraft, which is about three times the cost of a new F-15. There are rumors of a new cost increase from inside DoD, but details have not been reported.1/
This fighter is already the most expensive, in constant dollars, ever bought; it's unit cost also outstrips virtually all bombers, except the B-1B and B-2. In addition to the expensive technology, materials, and production techniques in this aircraft, there are bureaucratic reasons for this high cost. The production rate and total buy are very small, compared to historic norms (see historic production rates below). Moreover, while we have shrunk the number of active fighter production facilities as defense corporations merge together, the government and defense corporations have maintained over 20 facilities capable of producing modern fighter aircraft (according to an expert on defense manufacturing corporations, Mr. Herbert Fenster). Retaining all these facilities and the small production rates of the military aircraft we do produce makes for large (relative) overhead costs that increase the unit cost. For example, the F-22 will be fabricated at two huge Lockheed-Martin plants: the facility visited in Fort Worth and L-M's other huge facility in Marietta, GA. Were production facilities to be further concentrated, it is argued, unit costs would decline, especially if there were real competition among the survivors. Because of a "cap" on total program costs, any cost growth may result in a smaller number of aircraft purchased.
Test & Performance: As of this past Thanksgiving, the F-22 has flown 183 operational test flight hours. 4300 hours are planned. (4% of the flight testing has been performed.) Moreover, the test aircraft being flown are not production representative prototypes. For example, they lack "full-up" avionics; the first complete avionics aircraft will not be available for flight testing until February, 2000. All operational flight testing will be complete in 2004. By that time, a full commitment to F-22 production will have been made: A long way away from the central aircraft acquisition reform of the 1980sthe Packard Commission's "fly-before-you-buy" philosophy.
Additional Observations: During our tour of the factory floor, I was impressed to learn that just for the fuselage mid-section that is fabricated at the Lockheed-Martin plant in Fort Worth, no less than 60,000 fasteners are required to join metal and composite (advanced plastic) parts. Each fastener is done by hand and requires from 30 to 60 minutes. Just putting together the mid fuselage body parts (not including the electronics, engines, or other interior parts) requires 60,000 man hours.2/
This compares to the 29,000 (in 1984) to 45,000 (in 1989) man hours it used to take the Ft. Worth plant to fabricate an entire F-16, including the installation of all internal parts.
It is not entirely accurate to call the F-22 a Lockheed-Martin (L-M) aircraft: production of it is 67.5% from L-M; 32.5% is from Boeing. This means a $21 billion Boeing stake in the aircraft. Thus, should the F-22 encounter serious opposition in Congress, which thus far has not been the case, Boeing would likely be almost as opposed as L-M.3/ On the other hand, in the highly unlikely event that the F-22 is canceled, a logical reaction would be to buy increased numbers of (Boeing) F-15s. Also, Boeing's one-third share of the F-22 appears to be typical of modern military aircraft production: it is often a shared, not a competitive, enterprise.
Summary: The Navy plans to purchase 548 F-18 E/Fs.4/ The "E/F" nomenclature denotes a new model series of the F-18; the earlier model was the C/D. The E and C models are single seat; the D and F models are two seaters. The F-18 is also sometimes identified as the F/A-18 to denote its multi-role design as a fighter (hence "F") and as an attack (bomber) aircraft (hence "A"). The E/F model is an extensive modification of the existing F-18 C/D: new wings, fuselage, engine inlets, avionics, and more. Some call it a whole new aircraft.5/ This is an issue in itself: in the early 1990s the Navy argued that prototype flight tests were not needed because the E/F was just an "upgrade," and 1,000 C/D "prototypes" were already flying. More recently, after the E/F encountered some unpleasant surprises in early flight tests, the Navy changed its rhetoric to argue that these types of glitches are typical for "new" aircraft. The E/F is being developed and built by Boeing at the former McDonnell-Douglas facility in St. Louis, MO. Northrop in CA also has a major share.
The Navy's justification for the E/F is the improvements it brings over the C/D in range (approximate 20% improvement, up to about 450 nautical miles [NM]), payload (about 30% improvement, up to 17,750 lbs), survivability (5 times more survivable) and "bringback" (ability to land on a carrier with more under-wing stores: 5,000 lbs over the C/D's 1,500 lbs). Each of these improvement estimates is under dispute; the cited figures are based on Navy/contractor estimates, rather than the critics'.
Cost: According to Navy data, the 548 aircraft will cost $46.1 billion for R&D, procurement, and MilCon, or $84.1 million each. GAO calculated existing C/D's to cost about $44 million each: almost half the E/F. The Navy says the cost increase for the E/F will be more like 40%; the difference with GAO comes mostly from a different assumption about production rates.
Note that the percentage-improvements cited above in range and payload are one- half to three-fourths the cost increase, as calculated by the Navy. The cited improvements in survivability and "bringback" are much more, but there are caveats here; see below.
Test & Performance: The E/F has completed the first stages of its operational flight tests. There are public reports that the Navy test pilots judged the aircraft either marginal or unacceptable as a fighter and inferior as a dogfighter to the C/D model. There are also some reports of a problem with "bringback." The relevant test report is available, but only in classified form. Contrary to past practice for these reports, virtually the entire text has been classified.
The 20% improvement in range, cited above, is also in dispute. Not only is this reportedly an issue in the test report, but also different parties can (and do) manipulate the calculations, depending on their biases, by using dissimilar assumptions in comparing the C/D with the E/F: e.g. using different size under-wing fuel tanks, altering the mission scenario for one aircraft with more low level [fuel consuming] flight; compare the heavier, two seat D to the single seat E; use non- empirical simulation data compared to actual flight test results (which may actually be one of the elements in the E/F range comparison to the C/D), etc., etc., etc..
While the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas representatives disagreed with me, I was unimpressed with the claim of a five-times improvement in survivability for the E/F. Much of this claim is based on the assertion that, while the F-18E/F is not a "stealthy" or low observable aircraft, it does have a smaller radar cross section (a common measure of radar delectability) than the C/D. (The purpose here is to reduce radar detection range.) There are, however, two major caveats: 1) the reduction of the aircraft's radar signature is only on the forward facing part of the aircraft, and the aircraft is unstealthy from the side or rear. This is an important consideration because in combat, radar searches can and should be expected from all aspects, and if you can get yourself nose-on to an enemy radar to reduce detection range, there's very often another radar "out there" in a different location. 2) Also, I understand that the reduced, nose-on radar signature is only for a "clean" configuration; that is when the aircraft is carrying no air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions, and/or extra fuel tanks. The under-wing stores have their own radar signature that will "light up" typical search and tracking radars. Thus, in what I would call a tactically useful configuration, the E/F would appear to have no meaningful "stealth" advantage over the existing "C/D."
Additional Observations: There is a disturbing juxtaposition between the F-18 E/F and the F-22. The F-22 is a "stealth" airplane; the F-18 E/F is not. The Air Force says stealth is a must for effectiveness in the early twenty-first century; the Navy says it is not nearly so urgent. The Air Force also counts "supercruise" as a must, and it has designed a lot of aerodynamic agility (high thrust-to-weight ratio and extreme maneuverability) into the F-22. The F-18E/F is not a "super-cruiser," and it's aerodynamic agility is described by many sources as a step backwards from the predecessor F-18C/D.6/ Some in the Navy will explain that dogfighter capabilities in the F-18E/F were consciously compromised to enable more effectiveness as a bomber. And yet, the F-18E/F has very modest range and payload as a bombercompared either to the Navy's former bomber aircraft the A-6E, or the Air Force's fighter-bomber, the F-15E. One of these services is wrong, and one of these airplanes could be a mistaketheir individual merits and weaknesses notwithstanding.7/
It is interesting to compare the F-18E/F to the Air Force's preferred fighter/bomber, the F-15E: the F-18E/F has substantially less payload, less range, less avionics, and it very probably is less of a performer aerodynamicallyas a dogfighter. And, yet, at $80 million-plus per copy, the F-18E/F costs more than the F-15E, at approximately $60 million per copy.
Both of these aircraft are costly. Even the less costly F-18E/F will be the most expensive fighter, per unit, in US history in constant dollarsexcept for the F-22. At that price, the Navy will get a multi-role fighter-bomber with fighter characteristics that appear to be something less than the existing F-18C/D and with a bomber payload and range that compares unfavorably with current and past fighter-bombers and attack aircraft.
Summary: From the late 1970s to the present, the US built over 4,000 F-16s, 2,200 of them for the US Air Force; the rest were sold abroad. F-16s now constitute 55% of the Air Force "fleet" (also including F-15s, A-10s, & F-117s). The F-16 was designed in the 1970s to be an effective "dogfighter" and to be affordable in large numbers. It was acknowledged that sufficient numbers of F-15s were not affordable.
The F-16 acquisition was part of an ongoing debate over "quality vs. quantity" in the Air Force. The Air Force dubbed the F-16 to be the "low" end of a "high-low" (cost & capability) mix. Some refuse, however, to equate lower cost with lower performance. For example, the F-16 is generally acknowledged to be a better (more agile) dogfighter than the more expensive F-15. Moreover, various evaluations of low and high cost aircraft (including the Air Force's own Aimval-Aceval exercises of the late 1970s and GAO's evaluation of Desert Storm) failed to confirm that higher cost (and complexity) necessarily equates to higher performance.
The F-16 fleet is aging; the F-22 is not affordable in the numbers needed to replace the F-16. The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is planned to be both affordable and purchased in sufficient numbers (2,800) to fill out the Air Force tactical aircraft inventory, starting in 2008. The Navy will also buy 480 naval JSF variants (stronger structure to withstand structurally demanding aircraft carrier landings); the Marines will buy 680 JSFs to replace its entire F-18C/D & AV-8B fleet.8/ The Marine Corps version will have vertical and short take off capability, like the current AV-8B. This adds weight, reduces range and payload, and has forced the Marines to forego a gun integral to its version of the JSF. This is quite ironic, given the Marines, apparently now past, tradition of emphasizing close air support for its ground forces, for which a gun would be key. [The Marines may add a gun pod to swing out on a trapeze from the bombay, which of course adds further weight and reduces further the range and/or payload.] Clearly, there are severe costs, beyond just money, for the vertical and short take-off capability the Marines want. In terms of weight, range, and payload, the Marines' version of the JSF portends to be the least capable, while also the most expensive. and the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy are participating in the program and may buy as many as 150 JSFs.
Cost: Boeing and Lockheed-Martin are competing for the JSF contract. In addition to the 4,110 JSFs to be sold to the US and the UK, both contractors expect significant sales to replace several thousand F-16s, F-18s, and older F-4s and F-5s sold abroad. The competition that resulted in the Air Force's selection of the F-16 was known as "the deal of the century;" the JSF selection will surely be the first giant arms deal of the 21st century. Thus far, this is a winner-take-all competition; the stakes are high. Based on the performance of "concept demonstrator" aircraft, a selection is scheduled for 2001.
The contractor projected costs range from $28 to 38 million (in FY 1994 dollars), depending on the version (USAF version is least expensive; USMC version is most expensive). Even though affordability is a key factor in this program, many analysts are extremely skeptical that these aircraft can be designed and built for these prices. It's not that it is impossible; it's that it will take unprecedented discipline by the military services, the joint-service program office that is managing this program, and the contractors to keep costs from growing (resulting from added goodies and complexity). Already, DoD's Cost Assessment Improvement Group (CAIG) has estimated the most likely cost to be about 25% above what the Joint Program Office estimates, and the Joint Program Office estimates are above those of the contractors. The closer we get to a flying prototype, the higher the cost estimates will likely go. Cost growth has correlated with time in the past, and unless there are extraordinary efforts on this aircraft (efforts not demonstrated on the F-22 or F-18E/F), history is likely to repeat itself.
Test & Performance: The current schedule is for -
2001: concept demonstrator aircraft 2001: "down-select" winning contractor 2004: start "long lead" & "low rate initial production" 2004: start developmental testing 2007: end developmental testing 2007: start operational testing 2008: end operational testing 2008: start full rate production.
This schedule has the advantage of completing operational (combat realistic) flight testing before a commitment to full rate production, which is not the case with either the F-22 or the F-18E/F. On the other hand, there will be three years for further development between the selection of a winning "concept demonstrator" and the beginning of developmental testing. This shows that the "concept demonstrator" will be anything but a production representative prototype; it could be here that the cost, weight, and schedule slippage can occur if the program loses discipline.
Additional Observations: Based on analysis from DoD's PA&E, GAO, CBO, and numerous private research organizations, it is conventional wisdom to declare DoD's tacair plan for the future to be in trouble. Even if everything goes perfectly in the plan in terms of cost, schedule, and performance, too few aircraft are being built for too much money. The JSF is central to making this overall tacair plan work, and yet the JSF is probably the most uncertain in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. While the JSF program unfolds, the existing inventory of F-15's, -16s, -18s, A-10s, and other aircraft are aging to previously unheard of lengths for tactical aircraft. The tacair plan is a high risk one, and, if the JSF program unravels, we could end up holding a figurative, and literal, bagof very old, worn out airplanes and no affordable way to replace them.
Summary: The V-22 is the Marines' "tilt-rotor" aircraft that rotates its engines/propellers to enable it to fly vertically, per helicopters, or horizontally, per conventional aircraft. This technology has been in development since the 1950s. The Marines currently plan to buy 360; the Navy 48, and the Joint Special Operations Command 50. The Army plans no purchases and has determined to continue to rely on conventional helicopters to deliver troops and cargo vertically to battlefields.
Cost & Performance: "Flyaway" cost (just the procurement cost, not counting R&D) will be about $40 million per unit in 1998 dollars, according to the contractor. Based on incomplete data, I calculate the total program unit cost to be very roughly $60 million per copy. This is about twice the cost, or more, of large, modern helicopters.
While the price is steep, there appears to be a significant difference between the V- 22 and the Navy/Air Force aircraft discussed above. The survivability of vertically landing, troop/cargo deliveries to battlefields is a key consideration. In the Vietnam War, with little more than small arms, the Viet Cong shot down 5,000 US helicopters.9/ Some consider this estimate to be low due to our practice of recovering remains of shot down helicopters, sending the parts back to Texas for complete re-builds, and declaring the helicopter in question to be merely "damaged." I was pleased to learn from Bell-Textron that the V-22 can convert to vertical flight, decelerate, and land into a "hot" landing zone significantly faster than a conventional helicopter. If true, this could have a real impact on V-22 survivability by reducing the time exposure to hostile fire. Assuming the V-22 also incorporates other effective survivability enhancements over notoriously vulnerable helicopters, this could be a real improvement.10/ This survivability issue is more complex than described here. Hopefully, the V-22's operational testing will be thorough and realistic enough to provide a comprehensive, reliable answer.
In addition, according to Bell-Textron data, the V-22 has something between five- times and seven-times the range of a conventional CH-46 helicopter, almost twice the speed, and more than twice the payload. Assuming these contractor data are accurate and V-22 runs into no significant problems in the currently on-going operational tests, there appears to be a big difference between this aircraft and the fighters discussed above: while the V-22 brings a very significant increase in cost, it also brings a significant increase in performance. The fighters do not bring performance improvements commensurate with their cost increases. The V-22 may be expensive, but at least it brings some performance improvements in proportion to its very high cost.
I believe, there are three issues the V-22 needs to face: 1) Assuming it brings all the performance increases advertised, how important are the increases to Marine Corps combat effectiveness in the 21st century; 2) Is the V-22's high cost affordable?, and 3) The V-22 is new technology, and it is a very complex aircraft. Reports of poor reliability are beginning to surface. If these reports are accurate, can these problems be resolved and the results verified in further testing?
Historic Perspective: The current extremely small rate of production of US tactical aircraft is a relatively recent phenomena. Consider the following data for World War II and Cold War fighter and bomber production. (These data are just for Army Air Force and US Air Force aircraft and do not include the many thousands produced for the Navy and Marine Corps.)
Aircraft Type # Produced 11 / Source: "Gallery of Classics," Air Force Magazine, February, 1997.
World War II Heavy & Medium Bombers B-17 Flying Fortress 12,731 B-24 Liberator 18,481 B-25 Mitchell 11,433 B-26 Marauder 5,266 B-29 Superfortress 3,967 A-20 Havoc 7,478 A-26 Invader 2,452 Total 61,808
Fighters P-38 Lightning 10,038 P-39 Aircobra 9,558 P-40 Warhawk 13,738 P-47 Thunderbolt 15,683 P-51 Mustang 15,621 Total 64,638
Major Cold War Aircraft Bombers B-36 Peacemaker 385 B-47 Stratojet 2,041 B-52 Stratofortress 715 B-57 Canberra 403 B-58 Hustler 116 B-66 Destroyer 294 Total 3,954
Fighters F-4 Phantom II 5,201 P-80 Shooting Star 1,731 F-84 Thunderjet 7,524 F-86 Sabre 6,353 F-94 Starfire 1,052 F-100 Super Sabre 2,294 F-101 Voodoo 807 F-102 Delta Dagger 1,000 F-104 Starfighter 2,536 F-105 Thunderchief 833 F-106 Delta Dart 340 Total 29,671
My point in showing these numbers is not to infer that we should put any of these antiques back into production. My point is that the United States has a tradition of producing combat aircraft in impressive numbers. Moreover, many of these designs - - but certainly not allwere highly successful against their contemporary competition; they were the best we could design and produce at the time; they were not cheap or second rate mass produced throw-aways.
When you add the time and expense we historically took to train our aircrew (often better than our competition), we have been able to control, if not dominate, the skies, individually and collectively, against anyone we have met.
Advocates of the current acquisition plans will argue that, while we will buy the new aircraft in reduced numbers, they will have such improved performance that overall force capability is increased. This contention does not stand up to scrutiny.
The F- 22, V-22, and JSF are all untested and unproven. Assuming for the moment that each lives up to all performance promises, the comparisons with existing lower cost alternatives are always one on one; they are not a comparison of a set amount of procurement dollars; how many units of each high and low cost alternative that money would buy, and what those alternative forces can achieve. Moreover, to the extent that the F-18E/F has been tested, it seems to be doing poorly on some key measures and even a step backward in some respects. Equally to the point, in 1997, GAO assessed the performance of aircraft in the Gulf War in 1991 and found that high per unit aircraft cost did not correlate with better performance; that low costs did not correlate with low performance, and on some measures the low cost aircraft performed better than the high cost ones.12/
High cost very often equates to increased complexity; complexity can result in reduced performance. Successful weapons are often, certainly not always, simple brilliant designs that come with the associated benefit of low cost and high producability: two World War II examples are the US P-51, which out performed the more complex and expensive US P-38, and the Soviet T-34 tank, which outperformed the more complex and expensive US Sherman.
If DoD is correct to say that we face a significant conventional threat in the air that justifies a new generation of fighters, we appear to be engaging in unilateral disarmament. The numbers we are too modest, and the costs are too immodest. Moreover, we seem to crave committing to production of new models before we establish whether they are effective. And, we are giving our shrinking inventory of pilots less and less training.13/
In terms of pilot training, we may be in trouble. Per month training hours for combat pilots is declining: 20 hours of air combat training (not just flying around) per month is commonly thought of as acceptable (but not great) recent reports has it down to 15 hours per month, and declining.
In short, while our inventory of aircraft and pilots shrinks, ages, and become less ready
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we are paying too much for new tactical aircraft; |
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we are buying too few of them; |
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we are testing them too late; |
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even if some of these aircraft meet all their specifications, the improvements are not commensurate with the cost increase, and the performance edge over the postulated threat may be modest or non-existent, and |
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the success of the overall DoD plan depends on meeting cost and performance goals for the JSF that require discipline that DoD has been unable to demonstrate for the F-18E/F and F-22. |
1 This fighter is already the most expensive, in constant dollars, ever bought; it's unit cost also outstrips virtually all bombers, except the B-1B and B-2. In addition to the expensive technology, materials, and production techniques in this aircraft, there are bureaucratic reasons for this high cost. The production rate and total buy are very small, compared to historic norms (see historic production rates below). Moreover, while we have shrunk the number of active fighter production facilities as defense corporations merge together, the government and defense corporations have maintained over 20 facilities capable of producing modern fighter aircraft (according to an expert on defense manufacturing corporations, Mr. Herbert Fenster). Retaining all these facilities and the small production rates of the military aircraft we do produce makes for large (relative) overhead costs that increase the unit cost. For example, the F-22 will be fabricated at two huge Lockheed-Martin plants: the facility visied in Fort Worth and L-M's other huge facility in Marietta, GA. Were production facilities to be further concentrated, it is argued, unit costs would decline, especially if there were real competition among the survivors.
2 This compares to the 29,000 to 45,000 man hours it used to take the Ft. Worth plant to fabricate an entire F-16, including the installation of all internal parts.
3 On the other hand, in the highly unlikely event that the F-22 is canceled, a logical reaction would be to buy increased numbers of (Boeing) F-15s.
4 The "E/F" nomenclature denotes a new model series of the F-18; the earlier model was the C/D. The E and C models are single seat; the D and F models are two seaters. The F-18 is also sometimes identified as the F/A-18 to denote its multi-role design as a fighter (hence "F") and as an attack (bomber) aircraft (hence "A").
5 This is an issue in itself: in the early 1990s the Navy argued that prototype flight tests were not needed because the E/F was just an "upgrade," and 1,000 C/D "prototypes" were already flying. More recently, after the E/F encountered some unpleasant surprises in early flight tests, the Navy changed its rhetoric to argue that these types of glitches are typical for "new" aircraft.
6 Some in the Navy will explain that dogfighter capabilities in the F-18E/F were consciously compromised to enable more effectiveness as a bomber. And yet, the F-18E/F has very modest range and payload as a bomber compared either to the Navy's former bomber aircraft the A-6E, or the Air Force's fighter-bomber, the F-15E.
7 It is interesting to compare the F-18E/F to the Air Force's preferred fighter/bomber, the F-15E: the F-18E/F has substantially less payload, less range, less avionics, and it very probably is less of a performer aerodynamicallyas a dogfighter. And, yet, at $80 million-plus per copy, the F-18E/F costs more than the F-15E, at approximately $60 million per copy.
8 The Marine Corps version will have vertical and short take off capability, like the current AV-8B. This adds weight, reduces range and payload, and has forced the Marines to forego a gun integral to its version of the JSF. This is quite ironic, given the Marines, apparently now past, tradition of emphasizing close air support for its ground forces, for which a gun would be key. [The Marines may add a gun pod to swing out on a trapeze from the bombay, which of course adds further weight and reduces further the range and/or payload.] Clearly, there are severe costs, beyond just money, for the vertical and short take-off capability the Marines want. In terms of weight, range, and payload, the Marines' version of the JSF portends to be the least capable, while also the most expensive.
9 Some consider this estimate to be low due to our practice of recovering remains of shot down helicopters, sending the parts back to Texas for complete re-builds, and declaring the helicopter in question to be merely "damaged."
10 This survivability issue is more complex than described here. Hopefully, the V-22's operational testing will be thorough and realistic enough to provide a comprehensive, reliable answer.
11 Source: "Gallery of Classics," Air Force Magazine, February, 1997.
12 Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air Campaign, GAO/NSIAD-97-134, U.S. General Accounting Office; June, 1997; Washington, D.C.
13 In terms of pilot training, we may be in trouble. Per month training hours for combat pilots is declining: 20 hours of air combat training (not just flying around) per month is commonly thought of as acceptable (but not great) recent reports has it down to 15 hours per month, and declining.