Franklin C. Spinney

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction

  2. Statements by the USD(A) and Ch. JCS  

  3. The Defense Death Spiral

  4. Ready for What?

  5. Background: The Evolution of War

  6. Are There Evolutionary Pathways That Might Carry Forward Into the Future?

  7. End of the Cold War: Strategic Changes

  8. Implications for Future Capabilities

  9. How is the Pentagon Adapting to the End of the Cold War?

  10. What Near-term Threat Should We Prepare For?

  11. Readiness Critique

  12. What Threat Should Guide Modernization for the Long Term?

  13. Modernization Critique

  14. Pattern of Programmatic Adaptation

  15. Changes in DoD Budget (Constant Dollars)

  16. Comparative Expenditures: Historical and Vs. Any Conceivable Threat

  17. DoD Budget in Constant Dollars

  18. End of Cold War vs. End of Vietnam: Pattern of Change

  19. Asymmetries Help Discern the Pathway to the Train Wreck

  20. Why DoD has Readiness Problems, Even Though Per Unit O&S Spending Remains High

  21. Defense Death Spiral: Modernization Program

  22. USAF TACAIR Procurement & Budgets (1953 - 2017)

  23. USAF TACAIR Inventory and Average Age (1953 - 2017)

  24. A Perfectly Executed Modernization Program WILL NOT Modernize the Force! (AF Aircraft)

  25. A Perfectly Executed Modernization Program WILL NOT Modernize the Force! (Army & Navy Equipment)

  26. Operating Costs and the Rising Cost of Low Readiness Title Chart

  27. Defense Death Spiral: The Rising Cost of Low Readiness

  28. Ingredients of Operational Excellence: People - Ideas - Hardware

  29. E-mail From the Troops

  30. America's Growing Officer Surplus

  31. Officer Statistics (1945 vs. 1997)

  32. Officer Bloat: Summary & Effects

  33. AF Operations vs. Spending: The Rising Cost of Low Readiness (1950 - 2003)

  34. Mutually Reinforcing Effects: Aging Equipment, Increasing Complexity, Infrastructure Inefficiencies

  35. Direct Effect of Aging on Large Jet Transports

  36. Increasing Complexity Interacts with Average Age to Drive Up Costs

  37. Increasing Complexity Increases Costs (Notwithstanding Promises of Lower Operating Costs)

  38. The Rising Cost of Low Readiness: USAF Bombers

  39. The Rising Cost of Low Readiness: Army

  40. The Rising Cost of Low Readiness: Navy Ships

  41. The Rising Cost of Low Readiness: USMC Helos

  42. Age & Complexity Summary

  43. Displacement of Maintenance in Time and Space

  44. Observations on the Consequences of Displacement

  45. Indirect Consequences of Complexity-Induced Cost Growth

  46. Base Load Factors

  47. Defense Death Spiral: Accounting Shambles

  48. DoD's Budget Shambles

  49. Budget Shamble - Unauditable Books

  50. DoD's Budget Shambles: Plans - Reality Mismatch

  51. Example the Plans/Reality Mismatch and the Nature of Cost Overruns: Front Loading of the F-18A

  52. Defense Death Spiral: Front Loading

  53. Front Loading the F-18E

  54. What Would Happen if the F-22 / JSF had an Overrun Equal to Just 1/2 that of the F-18A?

  55. End Game:  Macro-Dynamics of the Inevitable Meltdown

  56. Possible Evolutionary Pathways Into the Future

  57. Recommendations: Aim of Reform

  58. Restoring Coherence and Integrity to Decision Making

  59. Recommendations: Policy Stand Down For a Reality Check

  60. Strategic Planning: An Idealized View

  61. How Can We Convert this Ideal into Reality?

  62. Stand Down for a Reality Check (I): Put DoD on "Autopilot" for a Year

  63. Stand Down for a Reality Check (II): Planning Options

  64. Stand Down for a Reality Check (III: Produce a More Relevant Adaptation to the Uncertainties of the Emerging World.

  65. Preventing the Collapse of Air Force Tactical Fighter Aviation: Illustrative Planning Options

  66. USAF TACAIR Inventory and Average Age Goals

  67. USAF TACAIR: Preventing Collapse

  68. Illustrative Acquisition Strategies

  69. Did Excessive Budget Reductions Degrade Readiness?

  70. Lincoln: The Dogmas of the Quiet Past


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