What if bin Laden were smart, like Dr. No or Ernest Blofeld?


28 Articles: a guide to a successful insurgency against America.

First in a series describing a potential threat to America


By Fabius Maximus

May 7,  2007



  1. Al Qaeda has not yet defeated us, to some extent because they are dumb as rocks.

  2. That is good, because so are we.

  3. Unfortunately, #1 could change at any time.

Background Information

For those of you who are not James Bond fans, Dr. No and Ernest Blofeld are evil master-minds. Dr. No operated a secret base under an island in the Caribbean. Ernst Stavro Blofeld was the founder and chief executive of SPECTRE, the Special Executive for Counter-intelligence, Terrorism, Revenge and Extortion – a secret global evil conspiracy.

What should be one of our greatest fears

What if bin Laden and the insurgent leaders in Iraq were as smart as these classic villains? What would they do next? They would consult the literature about modern warfare, the works of Martin van Creveld and others. Perhaps from these they could learn how to defeat America.

They would seek a Grand Strategy, what the late American strategist Col. John Boyd (USAF) said should focus one’s actions political, economic, and military – so as to:

Increase our solidarity, our internal cohesion.

Weaken your opponents’ resolve and internal cohesion.

Strengthen your allies' relationships to us.

Attract the uncommitted to your cause.

End conflicts on favorable terms, without sowing the seeds for future conflicts.

Patterns of Conflict, Chart 139

Then they would distil this into a handbook, perhaps with 28 steps or articles. It might look something like this…

Article #1: know your enemy.

Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district.

Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency”,
David Kilcullen, Military Review, May – June 2006.

This sets a high standard for “them” to be the world expert about us.” In WWII the leaders of neither the Japanese Empire nor the Third Reich came close to this mark, and so suffered catastrophic defeat. Al Qaeda has an advantage both of them lacked: thousands of people from the Middle East have studied and worked in America during the past fifty years. The combination of deep familiarity plus some cognitive and emotional distance might give them perspectives on America that Americans’ lack.

Fortunately al Qaeda has proven unable to conduct effected Information Operations and Public Diplomacy (IO and PD in the jargon of the counterinsurgency consiglieri). Perhaps even less effectively than our efforts in Iraq.

If al Qaeda can tap this knowledge, how might they apply it?  Bin Laden might start with Boyd's second point: Weaken “our” opponents’ resolve and internal cohesion.

He might easily wage info-warfare against us, seeking to fracture us, weaken our will to fight, and destroy our reputation in the eyes of our allies. It’s a small world today, tightly linked by the many news media. For example, al Qaeda could publicize and even exaggerate the damage done to Iraq’s infrastructure, the resulting suffering of its people, and most of all  the direct and indirect deaths of Iraq’s people since the invasion. As Juan Cole reports on his blog Informed Comment, the Middle Eastern media are filled with such stories – but al Qaeda has not attempted to convey these stories to receptive elements of American society.

Bin Laden might strike at the confidence of the American people in its military institutions and at the cohesion of our Armed Forces. Could he have written anything more damaging than these articles?

 Many female soldiers say they are sexually assaulted by their male comrades and can't trust the military to protect them. ”The knife wasn't for the Iraqis," says one woman. "It was for the guys on my own side."

The private war of women soldiers”, by Helen Benedict, Salon (March 7, 2007)

Or this…

I went to see Swift last July as I was immersed in a series of interviews with women who'd gone to Iraq and come home with PTSD. I was trying to understand how being a woman fit into both the war and the psychological consequences of war. The story I heard over and over, the dominant narrative really, followed similar lines to Swift's: allegations of sexual trauma, often denied or dismissed by superiors; ensuing demotions or court-martials; and lingering questions about what actually occurred.

 “The Women's War”, New York Times Magazine (March 18, 2007)

It's been three decades since women were admitted to West Point with a promise of equality for the sexes. But the nation's oldest service academy is marching into history as a misogynistic boy's club where sexual impropriety is endemic, some victims and advocates say. One West Point official who has worked with sexual assault victims for more than a decade said the climate is so hostile that, on average, 10 female cadets leave or are forced out of West Point every year after being raped, assaulted or abused.

“West Point's sexual dysfunction”, Times Herald-Record (April 29, 2007)

Consider the publication of these articles – and the ones to follow  as a tactical strike at the cohesion of our forces (alienating a key component group), at their reputation in the eyes of America’s citizens. In this sense their truth or falsity is irrelevant. All that matters are the consequences. This could open another front in the war – or perhaps more accurately another domestic front in the war.

If bin Laden had unleashed these articles, he would be a happy man today. If bin Laden was smart enough to exploit the internal divisions in our society, America would be in serious trouble. Fortunately for us, he is not that smart. Unfortunately, we are dumb enough so that he need not be so smart.

Our own worst enemy

The sharpest sword will rust when plunged into salt water.

Attributed to Lao Tse

There are a thousand ways bin Laden could attack our ability to wage war in Iraq. The Vietnam War was lost at home as well as on the battlefield, as our enemies attacked our heart as well as our fists. Inflicting such damage appears to be beyond al Qaeda’s capabilities, but our civilian and military leaders have proved able to do so without their help.

If you haven't heard the news, I'm afraid your Army is broken, a victim of too many missions for too few soldiers for too long.

“Is the Army headed for collapse?”, by Major General Robert H. Scales (ret.), Washington Times (March 30, 2007). The author is a former commander of the Army War College.

The U.S. Army broke in the 1970s in the wake of the Vietnam War and the end of the draft. … the crumbling occurred over time, becoming apparent only decades later. Today's Army is stretched past its breaking point by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The sounds of its collapse may be faint enough for policymakers in Washington to ignore, but they are there.

“Broken Arrow: How the U.S. Army broke in Iraq”, by Phillip Carter, Slate (March 30, 2007). Carter was a Captain in the US Army, with nine years of active and reserve service – including 2005-06 with the 101st Airborne in Iraq.

Recent graduates of the US Military Academy at West Point are choosing to leave active duty at the highest rate in more than three decades, a sign to many military specialists that repeated tours in Iraq are prematurely driving out some of the Army's top young officers.

"West Point grads exit service at high rate”, Boston Globe (April 11, 2007)

The above examples illustrate simple ways that al Qaeda could attack us. The next article describes even more effective and insidious techniques.

Article 2: Diagnose the problem

Analysis of the remaining 27 articles have been deleted by the Editors of DNI, as these insights could prove dangerous to America’s security if exploited by our enemies.


Are the things reported here good or bad? Please consult a priest or philosopher for answers to such questions. This author only discusses what was, what is, and what might be.

Please send your comments and corrections on this article to    


Who was Fabius Maximus?

Fabius Maximus was the Roman leader who saved Rome from Hannibal by recognizing its weakness and therefore its the need to conserve and regenerate. He turned from the easy path of macho “boldness” to the long and difficult task of rebuilding Rome’s strength and greatness. His life holds profound lessons for 21st Century America.

Qualifications of the Author?

Read the past articles by Fabius Maximus. A work of intellectual analysis stands on its own logic, supported by the author’s track record.

Review of The Changing Face of War, by Martin van Creveld, April 30, 2007

Iraq Series - 2006-2007

Part V – The Iraq insurgency has ended, which opens a path to peace, March 13, 2007

Part IV – Why We Lose, January 4, 2007

Part III – More Paths to Failure in Iraq, December 19, 2006

Part II – What Should We Do in Iraq? December 9, 2006

Part I – Situation Report on the Expedition to Iraq, November 12, 2006

Grand Strategy

Part IV – How America Can Survive and Even Prosper in the 21st Century, April 30, 2007

Part III America's Most Dangerous Enemy

Interlude Top Secret US Government Documents About Iraq

Part II The Fate of Israel

Part I The Myth of Grand Strategy


Forecast: the Death of the American Constitution, February 22, 2007

More Forecasts – Part Two

More Forecasts Part One

Forecasts for the American Expedition to Iraq – the Sequel

Forecasts for the American Expedition to Iraq

Lessons Learned from the American Expedition to Iraq

Women Warriors

The Rioting in France and the Decline of the State

The Plame Affair and the Decline of The State

Militia: the dominant defensive force in 21st Century 4GW?

Thoughts on William Lind’s Fourth Generation War field manual (FMFM 1-A)

Iraq Series - 2003

Scorecard #4: War in Iraq: New developments & Implications, November 22

Scorecard #3: A look at the Coalition’s Progress in Iraq, November 9

Scorecard #2: an Iraq Update, October 31

Scorecard #1: How well are we doing in Iraq? September 22

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