Fourth Generation Warfare
May 5, 2007
It has been said that "fourth generation warfare" (4GW) includes all forms of conflict where the other side refuses to stand up and fight fair. Smart commanders throughout history, however, have tried to deceive, trick, and confuse their opponents. Is anything really new?
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The answer begins by examining how 4GW literature uses the term, "generation." Specifically, it refers to the world since the mid-17th Century, when firearms began to dominate the battlefield and when nation-states began to exercise a legal monopoly on the use of armed force. That world is breaking down.
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[For a graphical depiction of how the "generations" evolve, please download The Evolution of Conflict (196KB PowerPoint - version 3, January 2007). Note that as with human generations, several may be alive and functioning simultaneously. The word "generations," though, is an analogy to help gain new insights, and it is wise not to push it too far. "Species" might be more descriptive, but "generations" seems to have stuck.]
We appear to be returning to the situation that characterizes most of human experience, where both states and non-states wage war. In 4GW, at least one side is something other than a military force organized and operating under the control of a national government. To distinguish 4GW from insurgency, though, the nonstate actor must have a goal other than simply taking control of the state.
One way to tell that 4GW is truly new is that we don't even have a name for its participantstypically dismissing them as "terrorists," "extremists," or "thugs."
Name calling, though, is not often an effective substitute for strategy.
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The attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center dispelled the notion that 4GW is simple "terrorism." But one can sympathize with our political and military leaders, because 4GW is a strange form of warfare, one where military force plays a smaller role than in earlier generations, supporting initiatives that are more political, diplomatic, and economic.
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As important as finding and destroying the actual combatants, for example, is drying up the bases of popular support that allow them to recruit for, plan, and execute their attacks. Perhaps most odd of all, being seen as too successful militarily may create a backlash, making the opponent's other elements of 4GW more effective.
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The authors of the first paper on the subject captured some of this strangeness when they predicted:
The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' may disappear.
One of the most pressing questions about 4GW is whether it should be considered as "war." This may seem an odd question because the aim of its participants, as in all generations, is to impose change on its opponents. From the viewpoint of outside powers, however, use of military force in these "transnational insurgencies" (as the new FM 3-24 calls them) has not proven successful. Iraq, for example, has ground down the world's most powerful military - a defense establishment that spends more than the rest of the world, combined. This makes no sense if the United States is at "war," but might if we regarded such conflicts differently.
Is 4GW Just Another Term for "Terrorism"?
For a variety of reasons, as sketched below and covered in detail in the papers on this site, most of the techniques that will be used in 4GW played peripheral roles in earlier generations of warfare and undoubtedly predate history itself. Today, two of the most frequently mentioned of these techniques are terrorism, as we have seen, and guerrilla warfare / low intensity conflict (LIC.)
The more the terror, the greater our victories. White Russian General Kornilov, 1917
We can't expect to get anywhere unless we resort to terrorism. Lenin, 1918
"Terrorism" (defined as seemingly gratuitous violence against civilians or non-combatants) has been a part of all generations of war. Until recently, in fact, most wars killed many more civilians than military and not all of this was accidental - recall the Rape of Nanking, the London Blitz, and the firebombing of Dresden. As 4GW blurs any distinction between "military" and "civilian," we can expect more activities that the general population will regard as terrorism. In other words, there may be more terrorism in 4GW, but it is not unique to nor defined by these attacks.
Is 4GW Just Another Term for "LIC"?
... members of native forces will suddenly become innocent peasant workers when it suits their fancy and convenience. - USMC Small Wars Manual, 1940
Similarly, because practitioners of 4GW will be transnational groups without territorially-based armies, much of their activity will probably resemble "guerilla warfare" or "low intensity conflict." These highly irregular practices have enabled groups that are weak, militarily, to defeat larger, stronger forces, and they have deep roots in the history of war. The word "guerilla" itself, for example, dates back 200 years to Napoleon's occupation of Spain.
Until recently, however, such "special" operations more often harassed than decided"sideshows" (as T. E. Lawrence once termed them) in wars fought mainly along 1st, 2nd, or 3rd generation lines. Examples could include operations by colonial militias and guerillas during the Revolutionary War, Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry raids, and the partisans during WWII. In the 20th Century, this situation began to change as insurgents and revolutionaries practiced guerrilla warfare in the early stages of most "national liberation" wars, including China and Vietnam. In these, it was an essential prelude to the large scale attacks to follow.
Fourth Generation Warfare (continued)
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Comments
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What are the Roots of Terrorism??? March 10, 2005 |
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Werther Report: What do Reinhard Gehlen and Ahmed Chalabi Have in Common??? February 23, 2005 |
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Who Won the Election in Iraq??? February 17, 2005 |
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Werther Report - 4GW & Riddles of Culture, December 30, 2004 |
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An OODA Loop Writ Large - 4GW and the Iraq War, December 23, 2004 |
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Just War Theory & the Question of COMPETENT AUTHORITY in a Representative Democracy, November 10, 2004 |
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4th Generation Warfare & the Changing Face of War, October 15, 2004 |
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How Mole Hunting Has Changed in the Good Ole USA: The Vest-Rozen Report, September 12, 2004 |
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How Bad Was U.S. Intelligence About Iraq???August 20, 2004 |
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Are Rising Oil Prices a Case of the Jitters
or a Harbinger of Longer Term Problems??? August 20, 2004 |
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Is Oil America's Achilles' Heel in Iraq??? August 17, 2004 |
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Loopy OODA Loops: The Triumph of Faith & Interests Over Facts & Reason, May 30, 2004 |
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How to Dumb Down Your OODA Loops May 17, 2004 |
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Iraq Net Assessment Strategic Overview and Recommendations May 15, 2004 |
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Conditioning the Masses in the Hall of Mirrors (II) April 10, 2004 |
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Is President Musharraf Impaled on his own Petard??? January 26, 2004 |
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Who is the Grand Ayatollah Sistani? January 18, 2004 |
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One From a Psyops Unit and the Other From a Journalist Based in Lebanon, January 8, 2004 |
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What Motivates Suicide Bombers? November 28, 2003 |
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Iraq, Afghanistan, & the War on Terror ... & ... the Helen Gurley Brown Solution, November 4, 2003
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Will Snowflakes from SECDEF Repair a Broken OODA Loop??? October 31, 2003 |
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Is America Inside its Own OODA Loop in Afghanistan and Iraq??? |
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4GW & Zinni's Question: What is Nature of Victory? September 20, 2003 |
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Why Outsourcing Military Operations is Bunk, September 19, 2003 |
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Why Declaring Victory in the Third Inning Can Set Us Up for Defeat in the Ninth Inning, September 16, 2003 |
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The Werther Solution: A Modest Proposal September 11, 2003 |
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Fourth Generation Warfare: How Tactics of the Weak Confound the Strong September 10, 2003 |
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The Chickens of Free Lunch Politics are Coming Home to Roost, September 5, 2003 |
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Get Real Before Domino Democracy Breaks the Bank, August 28, 2003 |
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Is US Troop Morale in Iraq Deteriorating??? June 15, 2003 |
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Lies, Damned Lies, & Military Intelligence, June 12, 2003 |
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The Men Who Would Not Be King June 3, 2003 |
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Is America a Fly Occupying the Flypaper???? May 29, 2003 |
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Will the Settlement Issue KO the Roadmap??? May 13, 2003 |
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Al-Qa'ida & Iraq: Another Cartesian Misconception??? February 11, 2003 |
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George Orwell on the Relation Between Freedom & the Rise of 4GW, January 1, 2003 |
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Bury Cold War Mindset, August 14, 2002 |
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Clash of Civilizations or the End of History? July 27, 2002 |
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Werther Report: Is Preemption a Nuclear Schlieffen Plan? July 20, 2002 |
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Is America Becoming a Police State?
July 15, 2002 |
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Captured by the One-Eyed Cyclops (I): Vest Report, March 22, 2002 |
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Is 4GW al-Qa'ida's Official Combat Doctrine? February 11, 2002 |
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How Pakistan's Triangular Tar Baby Lead to War Drums in South Asia, December 29, 2001 |
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Another Guy Who Got it Right, November 21, 2001 |
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4GW & the Question of Reform, November 16, 2001 |
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Fourth Generation Warfare - Background Reading, October 4, 2001
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Track Records Don't Count in a Town that Likes Pretty Faces, September 20, 2001
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The Struggle for Israel's Soul, August 20, 2001
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Iron Wall or Maginot Line? June 7, 2001 |
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The MacKenzie Proposal: Peacekeeping Reform & Grand Strategy, January 18, 2001 |
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The Palestinian Question - Is it a Colonialist War? October 21, 2000 |
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The Real Revolution in Military Affairs
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Can NATO Cope with 4th Generation War? May 29, 1999 |
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German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944), April 6, 1999
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Ready for What?
Loose Nucs, Scud Missiles, and the Changing Nature of Conflict, September 26, 1998
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Ready for What? September 16, 1998
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Food for Thought: Fourth Generation Warfare & the Relation of Strategy to Grand Strategy (III) August 31, 1998 |
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Food for Thought: Fourth Generation Warfare & the Relation of Military Strategy to Grand Strategy (II) August 28, 1998
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Fourth Generation Warfare & the Relation of Military Strategy to Grand Strategy
August 26, 1998
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